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ABSTRACT 
The market power analysis in electricity market is relevant for understanding the 
competitive development of the industry’s restructuring and the liberalization 
process. The paper analyzes the market power exercised by power generators in the 
Italian wholesale electricity market. Following the approach of Wolak (2003, 2009), 
the extent of market power is measured using the Lerner index computed as the 
inverse of arc elasticity of the residual demand faced by each Cournot competitors. 
Then, the market supply curves have been adjusted to entail market power effects 
and the new market resolutions were derived. The new equilibrium prices are the 
competitive ones and represent the market clearing price that would have been if the 
electricity market was competitive and the effects of unilateral market power were 
removed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The worldwide wave of power system restructuring led in Italy to the Electricity 
Market (IPEX) which started in April of 2004 and on 1st January 2005, the market was 
opened to full demand-side participation. Electricity Market has become a physical 
pool market where hourly blocks of electricity are traded. In Italy, the IPEX has been 
organized as a day-ahead market (MGP), intra-day market (MI) and ancillary service 
market (MSD), similar to other countries1.  
The main factors designing the structure and the degree of efficiency in the electricity 
market are essentially two: a technical factor, given by transmission capacity of the 
power grid, and an economic factor, given by the degree of market competition. 
Nevertheless, the Italian electricity market, as reported by Bigerna et al. (2015), 
recorded transmission congestions and its structure is far from being perfectly 
competitive: suppliers are able to exercise market power bidding prices higher than 
their marginal costs (see Bosco  et al., 2012).  
In this work we use hourly data of the Day-Ahead-Market for 2013 and 2014 and 
simulate the hourly market equilibrium prices in a virtual competitive market where 
operators' market power had been removed. The aim is finding how much the 
theoretical competitive prices are far from the actual recorded market clearing price. 
In the new open-market context the typical activities (generation, transmission and 
distribution of electricity) of this system have been carried out by separate entities. 
Electricity generation became a liberalized activity while transmission has been 
preserved as a regulated activity given that electricity is an instantaneous commodity 
that is expensive to store. Therefore, currently electricity generation must match the 
demand at each instant, responding to seasonal patterns and instantaneous 
                                                          
1
 The MGP is a wholesale electricity market, where hourly blocks of electricity are negotiated for the 
next day and where prices, volumes. injection and withdrawal schedules are defined for the next day. 
This is a non-compulsory pool administrated by a market operator, in Italian Gestore del Mercato 
Elettrico (GME). 
The MI market enable participants to update their demand bids and supply offers, as well as their 
commercial positions, with a frequency similar to the one of continuous trading, taking into account 
variations of power plants and consumption requirements. 
MSD is the market where Terna - as Transmission System Operator - procures the resources needed to 
manage, operate, monitor and control the power system (relief of intra-zonal congestions, creation of 
energy reserve, real-time balancing. 
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fluctuations. In order to satisfy this fluctuating demand, electric utilities are forced to 
maintain different generation assets (Muratori et al. 2014). Base-load electricity is 
provided by extremely reliable, efficient power plants (such as plants hydroelectric 
and coal power plants), which take a long time to start up and are designed to work at 
their nominal capacity with a small degree of flexibility. On the other hand, peak 
power plants run only when there is a high demand for electricity, they can be started 
up quickly and are flexible enough to match rapid fluctuations in the demand. Peak 
plants are less efficient (compared to base-load power plants) due to the high cost of 
the underutilization results in significant maintenance and capital recovery costs. 
The high complexity of the power system and the need of instantaneously 
coordination between the injection and withdrawal programs made imperative to 
identify a central coordinating entity, in charge of monitoring and guaranteeing the 
continuity and quality of the service under maximum security conditions. This center 
(Transmission System Operator) ensures that generation matches consumption at 
any time and that frequency and voltage do not deviate from the transmission limits 
on the grids and the dynamic constraints on power plants. For security management 
reasons, TSO divided the national grid into zones and the configuration of these zones 
depends on how the electricity flows are managed along the peninsula2. 
The structure of electricity market reflects the transmission constraints, as it is divided 
into portions of transmission grids (zones) where there are physical limits to 
transmission of electricity to/from the corresponding neighboring zones.  
The day-ahead market is based on an implicit-auction model and hosts most of the 
transactions of purchase and sale of electricity. Participants may submit bids/offers 
where they specify the volume and the maximum/minimum price at which they are 
willing to purchase/sell in each hour of the day.  
                                                          
2 These zones may be summarized as follows: 
- 6 geographical zones (central-northern Italy, northern, central-southern Italy, southern Italy, 
Sicily and Sardinia); 
- 8 neighboring countries’ virtual zones (France, Switzerland, Austria, Slovenia, BSP, Corsica, 
Corsica AC and Greece); 
- 4 national virtual zones representing constrained zones, i.e. zones consisting only of 
generating units, whose interconnection capacity with the grid is lower than their installed 
capacity. 
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TSO schedules the withdrawal and injection programs ranking the bids and the offers 
under the economic merit-order criterion given the transmission limits between 
zones. The ordered offers are then aggregated to form the hourly market supply and 
demand curves and the intersection between them determine the clearing price and 
the volume traded. 
If the flows on the grid resulting from the schedules do not violate any transmission 
limit, the clearing price is a single one in all the zones and equal to P*. Accepted offers 
are those having a selling price not higher than P* and accepted bids are those having 
a purchasing price not lower than P*. 
If at least one limit is violated, the national market is split in two zones: 
 one exporting zone, including all the zones upstream of the constraint, and 
 one importing zone, including all the zones downstream of the constraint.  
 all accepted supply offers are valued at the clearing price of the zone to which 
they belong. This price is determined, for each hour, by the intersection 
between the demand curve and the supply curve and is different from one 
zone to the other when transmission limits are saturated; 
 the accepted demand bids pertaining to withdrawal points belonging to 
geographical zones are valued at the national single price (Prezzo Unico 
Nazionale: PUN), which is equal to the average of zonal prices weighted for 
zonal consumption. 
If additional transmission limits within each market zone are violated, the market 
splitting process is repeated also within this zone until obtaining a result consistent 
with grid constraints. The above described market splitting mechanism represents a 
non-discriminatory implicit auction for the assignment of transmission rights. 
Given the restructuring process involving the electricity industry, the analysis of 
market power (that occurs when a firm is able to affect prices because of 
concentration in a single step of the supply chain) has become a central issue to 
understand the effectiveness of the liberalization process. The exercise of market 
power has important implications in terms of efficiency, as described by Borenstein et 
al (2002). In the short-run, for example, if a supplier exercising market power restricts 
5 
 
its output in order to raise prices, productive efficiency can be compromised by 
smaller players expanding generation from more expensive plants in response to the 
higher prices. In the medium and in the long-run, when demand is more elastic, 
market power may have an impact on the level of consumption and creates allocative 
inefficiencies. In particular, the marginal value of the next unit of consumption will be 
in excess of the marginal cost of some units of withheld supply. Market power can 
increase the level of congestion on a network, thereby affecting efficiency and 
reliability of the system (Cardel et al., 1997). Finally, market power can influence long-
term decisions: an increase in power prices should ideally be interpreted as a signal for 
investors that new capacity is needed, but this may not be the case if market power is 
being exercised (dynamic inefficiency). 
This paper is organized as follow: section 2 describes the frequencies of market 
segmentation and the main configuration when Italy is split in two market. In third 
section the theoretical model underlying the measurement of market power is 
explained while in Section 4 shows and discusses the Lerner indexes of the main 
suppliers, (representing their market power) the volumes and the equilibrium prices 
that would occur if IPEX market was perfectly competitive while in Section 5 the main 
conclusions are derived. 
2. DATA 
Data pertain the day-ahead market and refers to the hourly bids and offers recorded 
in the IPEX in the 2013 and 2014 and aggregated in quarterly datasets. In all the eight 
datasets, offers (representing the supply side of the electricity market) roughly 
account for the 70 % of the total sample average and they range between 924318 and 
1065778 while bid observations range from 259614 to 369661. 
2.1 The Italian Market Segmentation 
The Italian market is divided into six physical national zones: North, Center-North, 
Center-South, South, Sicily and Sardinia.  When there is a congestion market is 
segmented in a variable number of zone ranging from two to four during the 2013 and 
the 2014. 
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The number of zones which Italian market was split in varies throughout the period. 
Single Market occurred for 555 hours in 2013 and 716 hours in 2014. Segmentation in 
five zones (recorded for 2004-2007 in Bigerna et al., 2015) disappeared, while two-
market segmentation increased their occurrence becoming the most common market 
division3. Three-market segmentation appeared the 22% and the 33% of times in 2013 
and 2014 respectively, while the frequency of four-market segmentation reduced 
from 631 hours in 2013 to just 97 hours in 2014. 
Tab 1: Frequency of Market Segmentation, 2013. 
Hour Single Market 2 Market 3 Market 4 Market 
1 29 274 59 3 
2 35 273 55 2 
3 37 273 54 1 
4 40 277 47 1 
5 44 267 53 1 
6 50 263 51 1 
7 34 269 60 2 
8 20 281 51 13 
9 15 234 69 47 
10 17 202 80 66 
11 14 178 103 70 
12 19 146 132 68 
13 23 159 129 54 
14 26 156 140 43 
15 24 178 116 47 
16 27 173 111 54 
17 19 230 77 39 
18 18 265 53 29 
19 11 277 53 24 
20 9 248 92 16 
21 5 220 126 14 
22 2 260 90 13 
23 16 239 98 12 
24 21 271 61 11 
Total 555 5614 1960 631 
% 6.3% 64.1% 22.4% 7.2% 
 
  
                                                          
3 For a comparison with the frequency recorded in 2011, see D’Errico and Bollino (2015). 
Segmentation in two markets significantly increase their relative frequency, passing from 47% 
in 2011 to 64% in 2013 and 57% in 2014. 
7 
 
Tab 2: Frequency of Market Segmentation, 2014. 
Hour Single Market 2 Market 3 Market 4 Market 
1 38 216 105 6 
2 55 234 70 6 
3 65 239 55 6 
4 69 233 57 6 
5 68 237 56 4 
6 63 235 63 4 
7 53 239 70 3 
8 28 232 105  
9 26 201 137 1 
10 28 196 140 1 
11 19 172 173 1 
12 21 156 187 1 
13 15 169 180 1 
14 22 175 168  
15 18 163 183 1 
16 18 174 172 1 
17 15 210 140  
18 22 237 106  
19 12 240 111 2 
20 8 215 137 5 
21 9 200 146 10 
22 6 207 142 10 
23 14 209 125 17 
24 24 231 98 11 
Total 716 5021 2926 97 
% 8.2% 57.3% 33.4% 1.1% 
In this paper, the computation of Lerner index pertains the hours in which there was 
no congestion or the market was split in two zones. When single market occurs the 
price resulting from the market resolution is the same as the PUN and the order in 
which the bid are ranked reflects the economic merit order. On the other hand, when 
the market is split in two zones, we are able to reconstruct the uncongestioned 
situation. Given the shape of Italy, congestion is clearly determined and follows the 
North-South direction4, then it is possible to compute the virtual clearing price as the 
two zones were not separated by the line congestion5. 
                                                          
4 Given the shape of the country, the first five zones are adjacent along the North-South 
direction, the direction of congestion is univocally determined because power flows in the 
same direction from North to South. 
5 Following Bigerna et al., (2015) the limited production plants (which are essentially small 
generation islands with structural line transmission constraints) are not considered.  
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Focusing on two-market segmentation, the most prominent aggregation scheme is 
given by the Sicily as a market separate from the rest of the Italy; it appeared roughly 
the 84% of times in 2013 raising until the 93% in 2014. Moreover, during these hours 
just the 1.86% of times Sicily is an exported zone where its zonal price is lower than 
PUN. The North is separated from the rest of the Italy did not occur often, roughly in 
just 100 hours of the year and it is an exporting zone just for 25 hours.  
Tab 3: Segmentation in two market, the different configuration. 2013. 
Hour Northern Sicilia Sardinia 
CenterNorthern-
Northern 
CenterNorthern-
Northern-
Sardinia- 
CenterSouthern 
1 5 255 1 11 2 
2 1 249 0 23 0 
3 2 248 0 23 0 
4 2 250 0 25 0 
5 0 244 0 23 0 
6 0 238 0 25 0 
7 12 255 0 3 0 
8 5 270 1 3 2 
9 0 222 1 4 7 
10 2 188 2 2 8 
11 4 155 1 9 9 
12 6 118 0 13 9 
13 15 127 0 8 9 
14 22 122 0 8 4 
15 15 139 0 14 10 
16 2 158 0 8 5 
17 3 215 0 6 6 
18 2 255 0 3 5 
19 1 273 0 2 1 
20 2 242 1 2 1 
21 3 216 0 0 1 
22 6 252 0 1 1 
23 3 235 1 0 0 
24 1 258 2 8 2 
Total 114 5184 10 224 82 
% 1.8% 83.8% 0.1% 2.0% 0.7% 
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Tab 4: Segmentation in two market, the different configuration. 2014. 
Hour Northern Sicilia Sardinia 
CenterNorthern-
Northern 
CenterNorthern-
Northern-
Sardinia- 
CenterSouthern 
1 1 213 1 1 1 
2 5 227 1 1 0 
3 3 233 0 3 1 
4 2 229 0 2 2 
5 5 229 0 3 2 
6 2 227 1 5 1 
7 10 226 0 3 3 
8 1 230 0 1 2 
9 4 193 2 2 4 
10 8 187 0 1 11 
11 10 159 0 3 11 
12 14 136 0 6 12 
13 15 151 0 3 10 
14 28 145 0 2 7 
15 21 139 0 3 11 
16 13 156 0 5 18 
17 10 196 1 3 20 
18 4 233 0 0 5 
19 3 236 1 0 2 
20 7 207 1 0 0 
21 3 197 0 0 0 
22 0 207 0 0 0 
23 2 205 2 0 1 
24 0 229 2 0 2 
Total 171 4790 12 47 126 
% 3% 93% 0% 1% 2% 
 
Comparing these figures with the findings reported in Bigerna et al. (2015), it emerged 
that Sardinia drastically reduced its frequency as separate market and that depends 
on the increase in transmission capacity due to the new submarine cable (SAPEI) 
connecting Sardinia with the Center-South. 
When congestions occur the accepted offers do not reflects the economic merit order. 
Some bids (pertaining the importing zones) with higher price may be included in the 
market supply while more efficient plants (bidding lower prices and belonging to the 
exported zone) are excluded from the injection schedules and  can not sell their 
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production to the importing zones, as they can not violate the transmission 
constraints. In order to get rid of the effects of transmission constraints from the 
equilibrium market, we constructed a new supply curve where the offers are ordered 
according to the increasing price, while the demand curve is constructed aggregating 
the bids in a decreasing order price. 
The volumes and the clearing prices derived from the intersection of the two curves 
represent the market equilibrium purged of the effect of congestions. This procedure 
has been executed for all the hours in which national market has been split in two 
zones (roughly the 60% of the hours). 
With this method the efficient plants (belonging to the exporting zone) having 
effective marginal costs that actually were rejected from the grid, are reinserted in 
order to form the new supply curve.  Offers pertaining exporting zone with price lower 
than PUN are reinserted while offers related to the import zone with price higher than 
PUN are excluded from the new order. 
Given the hourly new supply curves, where the rank depends just on the economic 
merit order, we computed the residual demand faced by the companies of interest. 
The chosen firms differ in market share.  
Tab 5: Share of main Suppliers - Single Market, by Quarter, 2013. 
Quarter A2A EDISON ENEL ENI 
GDF 
SUEZ 
GSE SORGENIA 
1 2.83 4.34 21.74 0.32 2.06 17.25 2.48 
2 3.32 4.83 24.63 0.09 2.12 23.53 1.46 
3 3.63 4.27 16.59 0.08 1.15 19.75 1.63 
4 2.98 4.28 8.20 0.28 1.69 15.97 1.82 
Average 3.19 4.43 17.79 0.19 1.76 19.12 1.85 
 
Tab 6: Share of main Suppliers - Two-Market, by Quarter, 2013. 
Quarter A2A EDISON ENEL ENI 
GDF 
SUEZ 
GSE SORGENIA 
1 3.86 4.72 21.26 0.47 2.28 14.13 2.86 
2 3.65 4.74 24.63 0.12 2.18 20.18 1.47 
3 4.00 4.61 16.50 0.10 1.30 17.40 1.68 
4 3.82 4.55 8.89 0.20 1.77 13.45 2.08 
Average 3.83 4.66 17.82 0.22 1.88 16.29 2.02 
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Tab 7: Share of main Suppliers - Single Market, by Quarter, 2014. 
Quarter A2A EDISON ENEL ENI 
GDF 
SUEZ 
GSE SORGENIA 
1 4.15 4.66 9.77 0.05 1.46 15.18 1.33 
2 3.24 6.72 13.92 0.03 1.50 20.08 1.26 
3 2.55 7.24 9.46 0.02 2.26 17.55 1.25 
4 3.01 6.46 5.93 0.11 1.93 13.69 1.73 
Average 3.24 6.27 9.77 0.05 1.79 16.62 1.39 
 
Tab 8: Share of main Suppliers - Two-Market, by Quarter, 2014. 
Quarter A2A EDISON ENEL ENI 
GDF 
SUEZ 
GSE SORGENIA 
1 4.26 4.67 9.83 0.06 1.52 14.93 1.34 
2 3.27 6.75 13.87 0.03 1.55 19.88 1.25 
3 2.57 7.24 9.58 0.02 2.23 17.63 1.24 
4 3.01 6.47 5.91 0.11 1.92 13.72 1.79 
Average 3.28 6.28 9.80 0.06 1.81 16.54 1.41 
 
Enel, the former stated-owned monopolist, had a market close to 18% (both, in 2013 
and 2014). GSE, the state-owned company promoting renewable energy 
sources (RES) in Italy, held similar shares and in 2013 GSE reported the higher share 
(near to 19%) that is ascribable to the fact that GSE resells electricity generated by 
renewable-energy sources which dispatching priority is recognized to.  Then, all the 
GSE’s bids can be deemed as offers with price equal zero and, given their economic 
merit order, the GSE’s bids are always accepted in the injection schedules.  
The remaining firms whose the Lerner index was computed are A2A, Edison, Eni, Gdf 
Suez and Sorgenia. Although the Eni’s share would lead to deem that company 
operate as a price-taker firm, its history and its degree of integration across the 
energy industry activities, legitimate the choice to include Eni in the analysis of 
market power.  
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3. THEORETICAL MODEL 
Different methodologies have been proposed to measure market power: these 
include concentration measures, the competitive benchmark approach and the NEIO 
approach, models of optimizing behavior and direct measures of unilateral market 
power.  
The first approach to measuring market power focuses on observable dimensions of 
the industry structure such as market shares and related indices like the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI)6. This is given by the sum of squares of the market shares of 
the firms in an industry. However, this concentration measure is considered 
inappropriate to assess the level of market power in the electricity industry because it 
ignores key factors such as demand elasticity, transmission constraints, forward 
contracts and the inter-temporal variation in the exercise of market power. The 
largest suppliers may in fact exercise market power by withholding production once 
competitive firms had reached their full output generation capacity. As a result, the 
concentration of the market and the HHI index would reduce as the main firm was 
decreasing its market shares by withholding production, but the resulting equilibrium 
market-clearing price would raise above its competitive levels7.  
An alternative way to measure market power is based on the comparison between the 
actual prices and the simulated competitive benchmark price. This approach relies on 
simulation models to derive the competitive benchmark and provides an ex post 
measure of the mark-up. The comparison is often made through the Lerner index (LI): 
    
    
 
 (1) 
The index would be close to zero in competitive markets and to one if significant 
market power is exercised8.  
                                                          
6 The Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI) ranges from zero (representing a perfect 
competitive market) to one (pertaining a monopolist market).  
7 This strategic behavior was adopted by Borenstein et al. (2002) in order the market power of 
main suppliers in the California electricity market. 
8 This is an approach taken by Sweeting (2007), Borenstein et al. (2002) and Wolfram (1999). 
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The weakness of this approach is that inaccurate simulation models could produce 
erroneous estimates of marginal costs and competitive prices by ignoring 
commitment costs, ramping/must-run/transmission constraints and reliability.  
In the 1980 the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) developed a new 
empirical approach to measure market power (Bresnahan, 1989). The empirical 
models developed of NEIO literature estimate the level of market power exercised in 
an industry exploiting both the information given by empirical data (market-clearing 
prices and quantities) and the theoretical assumptions concerning the functional form 
of demand and cost curves, the type of strategic interaction among firms and on their 
expected profit maximizing behavior. Despite the great number of applications these 
models have the problem that their estimates of market power crucially depend on 
the assumption of the strategic interaction among firms and on the assumed 
functional form of demand and cost curves9.  
 
If bids of the wholesale markets are available, a more direct approach is the 
optimizing behavior model that makes possible deriving a measure of market power 
in electricity markets without assuming the specific functional form for the demand 
and the marginal cost curve. The relationship between price and quantity bid by each 
firm is analyzed through the response of all the other competitors. Supporting for this 
interpretation is provided by market rules in Italy, which do not restrict the ability of 
operators to submit bids. Accordingly, suppliers and purchaser can submit bids any 
time before market closure and revise bids freely for the entire daily span as many 
times as they deem necessary to adjust their injection and withdrawal programs. 
  
                                                          
9 Relying on simulated data, Corts (1999) shows that a static oligopoly model may return 
biased estimates. If firms’ underlying behavior does not come from a non-collusive static 
game but it results from a game of dynamic or tacit collusion, their first order conditions will 
differ from the ones predicted by the static NEIO models. 
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3.1 Model of optimizing behavior 
We assume that the model underlying the electricity market is an oligopolistic 
Cournot model: for any periodh , firm chooses the bidding strategy maximizing its 
profit function, given the bids submitted by all other competitors10.  
On the supply side the profit function faced by a generator is defined as:  
   
 ( ) ( )( ( ))ih ih ih h h h ih ip RD p p MC q F      (2) 
 
where ( )ih hRD p is the residual demand faced by the generator i  in period h , while 
( )i iMC q  is the marginal cost of output level iq  and iF  is the fixed costs
11.  
Assuming the generator acts unilaterally given the bids placed by other competitors, 
in any load period his goal is to find the quantity 
iq  that maximizes the profit. The 
best response bidding quantity is given by the output level at which the marginal 
revenue associated with that period’s residual demand equals the firm’s short-run 
marginal cost.12 
Regardless of the actual residual demand realization in a given hour, a generator 
maximizing profits unilaterally would face the following first order condition: 
                                                              
1h ih
h ih
p MC
p 

                                                       (3) 
where 
hp  is the market-clearing price in hour h , ihMC  is the marginal cost of 
generation of firm i  in hour h , and 
ih  is the absolute value of the elasticity of the 
residual demand curve facing firm i  j  in hour h , evaluated at 
hp . This empirical 
measure represents the amount by which each firm is able to raise prices above its 
marginal cost of generation in a given hour. The right hand side of the previous 
                                                          
10 The number of periods in which bids can differ, in a given day, varies by market and is 
defined by market rules; for example, in the IPEX market participants can submit different 
bids on every hour of the day. 
11Lo Prete (2015) and Wolak (2000) proposed a variation of profit function that entails for each 
period i  the forward contract quantity and their corresponding price held by generator. 
12 Wolak estimates a model of best-response bidding to recover the marginal cost function of 
the largest Australian power generator. 
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formula can be used to estimates an empirical “Lerner index” and the firm’s unilateral 
incentive to exercise unilateral market power. 
Since the empirical residual demand is a step function, computing its elasticity at a 
given point requires a finite difference approach; we use the arc elasticity whose 
inverse can be consider the empirical Lerner Index: 
 
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ih h ih h ih h ih h
ih
h h h h
RD P high RD P low RD P high RD P low
P high P low P high P low

 
 
 
 (4) 
 
where ( )hp high  and ( )hp low  are the respectively the prices below and above hp , 
while ( ( ))ih hRD p high  and ( ( ))ih hRD p low  are the quantities associated with those 
prices on the residual demand curve. The range where the arc elasticity was computed 
[ ( ), ( ))h hp low p high  includes market-clearing price.   
Following Wolak (2003) we compute the Lerner index as the inverse of residual 
demand elasticity for each suppliers of interest. 
 
3.2 The competitive Fringe 
We have implemented the standard Cournot model introducing a variant: the 
competitive fringe. In the both side of market (demand and supply) firms were divided 
into two categories: operators with small market share that it seems could not 
credibly attempt to affect the market price are treated as price-takers and they 
represent the competitive fringe price takers. On the other hand, larger firms are 
deemed to behave strategically. Generators that operate under inflexible, non-market 
based agreements are also treated as price-taking and added into the competitive 
fringe. Larger deregulated generators that it appeared could affect the market price 
under some conditions were assumed to follow Cournot strategies. 
We start constructing the supply and the demand step function. Given the sample 
distribution of the recorded prices, we recover 30 quantiles (which divide the price 
observations in 30 group of the same size) and we use them as the break point for the 
supply and the demand step function. 
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Secondly, we control for the effect of the fringe by subtracting the aggregate supply 
of these firms from the market demand at any given market price. Then, we subtract 
from the market demand the quantity supplied by the fringe firms at every price and 
the resulting curve is the net demand faced by Cournot price-maker players. 
Formally, the resulting demand curve faced by Cournot players can be written as: 
   
                    (5) 
Where ( )h hD p  is the market demand function, fS   represents the fringe supply curve 
and h  is the index used for denoting the hour of the day which the offers refers to. 
Finally, we construct the residual demand curves for the Cournot players given the 
assumption that, at the Cournot equilibrium, each firm is producing its profit-
maximizing quantity given the quantities that are being produced by all other Cournot 
participants.  
For each competitors we construct its supply curve by horizontally summing the 
hourly single offers (ranked in a non-decreasing price order), then we derive the 
residual demand for competitor i using the following formula: 
           
             
   
 (6) 
 
where *( )h hD p  is the net demand defined in (5), j  indexes firms that are Cournot 
players and ( )jh hS p with j i  is the supply curve of the Cournot players different from
i .  
Then we compute the Lerner Index for each operator for the price interval 
corresponding to the quantile where the market clearing price lies using the formula 
(4) of the arc elasticity. 
4. RESULTS 
Lerner indexes are computed for all the times in which single or two-market 
segmentation occurred; the aggregated values of estimates are averaged accordingly 
two main aggregation criteria: the quantile of the price distribution and the hours of 
the day. Tab.9-Tab.25 show for the main suppliers their average Lerner index 
aggregated by the quantiles of the market clearing price and the hours of the day.  
17 
 
Tab 9: Lerner Index of main suppliers, by Hour. Percentage Value. Single Market, 2013.  
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Tab 10: Lerner Index of main suppliers, by Hour. Percentage Value. Single Market, 2013. 
SO
R
G
EN
IA
 
4
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
1
8
.5
0
 
2
1
.9
0
 
2
1
.8
9
 
2
1
.9
5
 
0
.0
0
 
3
.9
6
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
8
.1
6
 
1
0
.7
1
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
1
0
.7
1
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
1
4
.7
3
 
3
 
3
4
.1
6
 
6
.8
3
 
4
.0
9
 
4
.9
8
 
4
.8
4
 
5
.5
9
 
3
.1
8
 
3
.9
9
 
0
.0
0
 
3
.6
7
 
3
.2
3
 
1
.9
8
 
2
.8
6
 
4
.6
1
 
3
.9
9
 
4
.3
5
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
6
.1
6
 
2
 
6
.3
9
 
6
.8
1
 
5
.5
8
 
9
.4
3
 
1
0
.2
0
 
8
.4
0
 
7
.1
1
 
4
.7
3
 
5
.5
4
 
7
.6
1
 
8
.5
8
 
5
.5
3
 
8
.4
4
 
1
3
.9
7
 
6
.9
8
 
9
.3
7
 
8
.6
8
 
7
.2
7
 
4
.5
9
 
7
.0
7
 
1
0
.2
6
 
5
.2
7
 
4
.2
0
 
3
.6
6
 
7
.3
2
 
1
 
4
.2
5
 
0
.0
0
 
8
.6
0
 
1
0
.9
4
 
0
.0
0
 
4
.8
4
 
4
.2
2
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
5
.6
5
 
5
.3
2
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
3
.4
2
 
5
.6
2
 
3
.6
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
3
.8
4
 
3
.1
2
 
5
.2
8
 
G
SE
 
4
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
4
.8
7
 
6
.0
9
 
6
.6
5
 
2
.6
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.2
6
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
1
.5
8
 
3
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
1
.0
8
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
3
.2
7
 
3
                          
2
 
5
.2
6
 
6
.3
3
 
5
.4
4
 
7
.3
4
 
9
.9
8
 
8
.1
7
 
5
.3
4
 
3
.6
0
 
4
.2
9
 
6
.3
2
 
7
.8
3
 
5
.3
1
 
8
.3
5
 
1
1
.9
5
 
6
.5
7
 
8
.3
6
 
7
.5
5
 
6
.4
3
 
3
.6
8
 
3
.8
9
 
6
.8
0
 
4
.4
2
 
3
.6
1
 
3
.1
0
 
6
.2
5
 
1
 
4
.1
2
 
0
.0
0
 
5
.6
5
 
5
.6
5
 
0
.0
0
 
4
.0
6
 
3
.8
2
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
5
.6
5
 
4
.0
6
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
2
.5
2
 
3
.0
0
 
2
.6
4
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
2
.5
2
 
2
.2
5
 
3
.8
3
 
G
D
F 
SU
EZ
 
4
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
1
9
.2
3
 
2
2
.3
9
 
2
2
.5
8
 
2
7
.1
3
 
0
.0
0
 
4
.9
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
8
.5
7
 
1
1
.1
5
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
1
1
.2
8
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
1
5
.9
1
 
3
 
3
.5
4
 
6
.2
7
 
2
.8
7
 
4
.9
1
 
4
.7
8
 
5
.0
4
 
2
.7
7
 
2
.8
0
 
0
.0
0
 
2
.6
7
 
2
.8
7
 
1
.7
8
 
2
.9
3
 
3
.3
0
 
2
.9
5
 
3
.0
5
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
3
.5
0
 
2
 
1
6
.9
7
 
1
5
.4
3
 
9
.9
9
 
1
4
.9
3
 
1
6
.9
6
 
1
6
.9
9
 
1
1
.9
4
 
8
.3
5
 
1
2
.3
8
 
9
.8
3
 
1
0
.8
5
 
8
.2
2
 
1
4
.5
6
 
2
2
.0
2
 
1
2
.5
9
 
1
4
.6
0
 
1
1
.7
9
 
1
3
.8
1
 
7
.1
9
 
1
2
.5
5
 
1
6
.7
1
 
5
.4
0
 
4
.4
7
 
8
.7
7
 
1
2
.3
9
 
1
 
4
.3
6
 
0
.0
0
 
5
.6
5
 
7
.0
5
 
0
.0
0
 
4
.1
1
 
4
.9
3
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
9
.3
5
 
6
.4
3
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
3
.0
9
 
4
.6
0
 
3
.3
4
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
2
.6
8
 
2
.7
5
 
4
.8
6
 
 
Q
u
ar
te
r 
1
 
2
 
3
 
4
 
5
 
6
 
7
 
8
 
9
 
1
0
 
1
1
 
1
2
 
1
3
 
1
4
 
1
5
 
1
6
 
1
7
 
1
8
 
1
9
 
2
0
 
2
1
 
2
2
 
2
3
 
2
4
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 
 
19 
 
Tab 11: Lerner Index of Main Suppliers, by Hour. Percentage Value. Two-Market, 2013 
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Tab 12: Lerner Index of Main Suppliers, by Hour. Percentage Value. Two-Market, 2013. 
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Tab 13: Lerner Index of main suppliers, by Quantile. Percentage Value. Single Market, 2013. 
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Tab 14: Lerner Index of main suppliers, by Quantile. Percentage Value. Single Market, 2013. 
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Tab 15: Lerner Index of Main Supplier, by Quantile. Percentage Value. Two-market, 2013. 
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Tab 16: Lerner Index of Main Supplier, by Quantile. Percentage Value. Two-market, 2013. 
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Tab 17: Lerner Index of main suppliers, by Hour. Percentage Value. Single-Market 2014. 
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Tab 18: Lerner Index of main suppliers, by Hour. Percentage Value. Single-Market 2014. 
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Tab 19: Lerner Index of main suppliers, by Hours. Percentage Value. Two-Market, 2014. 
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Tab 20: Lerner Index of main suppliers, by Hours. Percentage Value. Two-Market, 2014. 
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Tab 21: Lerner Index of main suppliers, by Quantile. Percentage Value. Single Market, 2014. 
EN
EL
 
4
 
3
3
.3
3
 
3
3
.3
3
 
1
9
.6
1
 
8
.0
9
 
6
.4
9
 
4
.4
8
 
3
.8
7
 
3
.3
9
 
3
.6
0
 
1
.9
5
 
1
.9
7
 
2
.5
3
 
2
.5
3
 
3
.1
3
 
3
.7
4
 
5
.1
8
 
4
.6
2
 
4
.1
1
 
8
.6
2
 0
.0
0
 8
.1
4
 
3
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
2
.5
6
 
3
.4
5
 
2
.6
7
 
2
.5
2
 
3
.0
1
 
3
.1
0
 
4
.1
2
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
6
.4
6
 
0
.0
0
 
1
0
.7
7
 
4
.3
0
 
2
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
1
6
.9
4
 
1
7
.3
7
 
9
.1
1
 
1
1
.7
3
 
1
1
.1
8
 
7
.6
9
 
1
1
.1
3
 
1
6
.7
5
 
1
7
.9
7
 
6
.8
2
 
4
.4
3
 
5
.5
5
 
1
6
.1
5
 
0
.0
0
 
4
1
.9
4
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
1
3
.9
1
 
1
 
0
.0
0
 
2
.0
0
 
3
8
.3
6
 
1
6
.9
4
 
1
7
.3
7
 
1
1
.1
9
 
1
1
.2
8
 
9
.9
4
 
8
.0
3
 
9
.9
1
 
1
2
.6
6
 
5
.2
2
 
8
.8
5
 
5
.3
7
 
7
.8
2
 
1
4
.0
9
 
1
4
.2
7
 
3
4
.0
1
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
1
3
.3
7
 
ED
IS
O
N
 
4
 
3
3
.3
3
 
4
3
.8
0
 
2
5
.6
0
 
9
.4
0
 
7
.2
9
 
5
.5
0
 
5
.5
6
 
5
.5
7
 
3
.7
0
 
3
.0
8
 
2
.6
7
 
2
.9
4
 
5
.4
0
 
6
.6
4
 
8
.0
9
 
1
1
.7
9
 
1
2
.2
5
 
1
0
.9
9
 
3
5
.3
6
 
0
.0
0
 
1
2
.5
8
 
3
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
5
.3
0
 
5
.8
4
 
6
.8
6
 
4
.1
0
 
4
.4
4
 
4
.1
2
 
6
.7
4
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
2
1
.6
3
 
0
.0
0
 
5
5
.6
8
 
1
2
.7
4
 
2
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
3
3
.9
2
 
3
3
.3
0
 
1
5
.3
2
 
1
5
.1
2
 
1
4
.0
4
 
1
2
.2
1
 
1
0
.0
0
 
1
2
.4
1
 
1
0
.1
5
 
8
.7
2
 
5
.3
5
 
7
.1
5
 
1
2
.4
9
 
0
.0
0
 
2
1
.1
7
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
1
5
.1
0
 
1
 
0
.0
0
 
5
.3
4
 
7
0
.3
2
 
3
3
.7
4
 
4
6
.0
0
 
1
7
.0
1
 
2
5
.2
6
 
1
2
.2
6
 
1
1
.2
8
 
1
2
.5
2
 
1
1
.0
7
 
5
.0
2
 
7
.8
0
 
4
.6
7
 
8
.3
2
 
1
8
.6
3
 
1
7
.1
7
 
2
8
.4
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
1
9
.7
0
 
A
2
A
 
4
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
2
.5
6
 
3
.9
0
 
2
.5
1
 
2
.9
8
 
3
.4
3
 
3
.5
2
 
4
.0
5
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
1
8
.4
6
 
0
.0
0
 
3
4
.1
1
 
8
.3
9
 
3
 
0
.0
0
 
2
.0
0
 
3
7
.7
5
 
1
9
.6
9
 
2
4
.1
1
 
1
0
.9
2
 
1
1
.2
0
 
8
.2
8
 
6
.1
0
 
5
.5
3
 
7
.5
4
 
3
.6
3
 
5
.8
3
 
4
.5
8
 
7
.6
4
 
1
8
.3
5
 
1
5
.7
9
 
2
2
.7
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
1
2
.4
5
 
2
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
2
9
.7
0
 
3
3
.0
6
 
1
2
.3
0
 
1
2
.1
8
 
1
1
.6
7
 
9
.1
8
 
5
.4
8
 
1
1
.2
4
 
1
0
.5
2
 
8
.9
5
 
4
.9
4
 
5
.7
6
 
1
4
.6
8
 
0
.0
0
 
2
3
.4
8
 
0
.0
0
 
0
.0
0
 
1
3
.8
0
 
1
 
5
4
.1
6
 
3
8
.8
3
 
2
1
.9
7
 
9
.3
8
 
7
.5
2
 
5
.3
0
 
5
.5
9
 
4
.6
1
 
3
.8
0
 
2
.7
2
 
2
.7
1
 
3
.1
4
 
5
.7
0
 
4
.0
8
 
5
.6
4
 
8
.0
2
 
8
.4
9
 
9
.2
4
 
3
0
.3
4
 
0
.0
0
 
1
2
.1
7
 
 
Q
u
ar
te
r 
2
 
3
 
4
 
5
 
6
 
7
 
8
 
9
 
1
0
 
1
1
 
1
2
 
1
3
 
1
4
 
1
5
 
1
6
 
1
7
 
1
8
 
1
9
 
2
0
 
2
1
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 
30 
 
Tab 22: Lerner Index of main suppliers, by Quantile. Percentage Value. Single Market, 2014. 
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Tab 23: Lerner Index of main suppliers, by Quantile. Percentage Value. Two-Market, 2014 
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Tab 24: Lerner Index of main suppliers, by Quantile. Percentage Value. Two-Market, 2014 
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The Lerner indexes derived using eq. (3) shows clearly the suppliers exercised different 
degree of market power; When single market occurred GSE reported the lowest 
values, equal to 3.27% in the fourth quarter of 2013 while ENEL recorded the highest 
(equal to 35.92%) during the first semester of 2013. ENEL, the former monopolist, 
shows a sizable market power when there is not congestion but the extent of its 
Lerner index decreased over the period considered. 
It needs to highlight that GSE’s Lerner index has not been computed for the third 
quarter of 2013 and the whole 2014. It means that, given the dispatching priority 
recognized to renewable plants, TSO assumed that all GSE’s bids have price equal to 
zero corresponding to a price-taker behavior. 
Lerner indexes computed for each strategic suppliers were than aggregated between 
peak and off-peak hours. Not surprisingly, the indexes are higher during off-peak 
periods, when the electricity demand is more inelastic and wholesaler purchasers are 
not able to change their withdrawal programs necessary to run their production 
activities. 
Moreover, during off-peak hours, the number of generators is lower and renewable 
plants, as photovoltaic plants, cannot generate electricity, reducing the degree of 
competition in the market. 
It is significant to notice that the computed market power was higher when market 
was divided in two zones. It reveals that when maximum simultaneous competition 
was possible, that is when there was no congestion and the market was not split in 
two zones, competition forces worked to make other operators become more 
aggressive13. Moreover, congestions during peak hours may suggest that electricity is 
an essential commodity whose demand is stiff and whose consumption cannot be 
postponed. 
  
                                                          
13
 These findings confirm the results reported in Bigerna et al. (2015) for the 2004-2007. 
34 
 
 
 
Tab 25: Average Lerner Index by Peak/Off-Peak Hours. 
Year 2013 2014 
 Single Two-market Single Two-market 
peak 8.98 10.43 6.89 7.18 
off-peak 11.03 11.17 7.94 7.63 
 
 
 
Tab 26: Average Lerner Index by Quarters. 
   1 2 3 4 
2
0
1
3
 
Single 
Market 
Peak 6.72 11.68 5.02 10.15 
Off-Peak 9.20 12.15 16.30 6.63 
Two-Market 
Peak 8.44 11.21 17.10 6.29 
Off-Peak 11.49 12.65 13.29 7.13 
2
0
1
4
 
Single 
Market 
Peak 6.62 8.53 4.44 8.61 
Off-Peak 11.11 8.04 7.79 4.31 
Two-Market 
Peak 8.11 8.70 5.85 6.04 
Off-Peak 8.94 8.96 6.63 5.80 
 
 
 
Tab 27: Average Lerner Index, By Main Supplier. 
 2013 2014 
 
Single 
Market 
 
Two 
Market 
 
Single 
Market 
 
Two 
Market 
 
 Peak 
Off-
peak 
Peak 
Off-
peak 
Peak 
Off-
peak 
Peak 
Off-
peak 
A2A 7.74 10.54 10.31 10.85 8.07 7.64 8.09 7.88 
EDISON 10.98 15.88 12.17 13.71 10.56 10.55 10.13 10.33 
ENEL 17.82 19.74 18.69 19.01 6.35 8.52 7.24 8.08 
ENI 5.49 6.42 7.20 8.65 4.11 5.90 4.70 4.99 
GDF SUEZ 8.11 9.78 9.45 10.92 7.61 8.36 7.31 8.43 
GSE 5.33 4.85 5.84 7.65 - - - - 
SORGENIA 6.36 8.54 8.13 8.24 5.81 6.04 5.58 5.79 
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Following Cramton’s approach (Cramton, 2004), the prices bid by the strategic firms 
were then adjusted using the estimates of their Lerner indexes (differing in the 
referring operator, quarter of the years and levels of price). The new prices are 
computed using the following formula: 
     
                 (7) 
Where i represents the operator, h represent the hour, while k refers to the quantile in 
which the price bid lies. 
The formula allows to depurate the prices from the effect of market power shifting 
the supply down. Moreover, given different Lerner indexes, the adjusted prices 
change the economic merit order of suppliers: having changed the price bid by the 
suppliers, the new supply curves are constructed summing the offers in a non-
decreasing price order different from the previous  merit order. 
Then, we cross the new supply curves with the demand in order to find the new 
market-clearing price for each hours of the 2013 and 2014. The difference between 
the old and the new marginal price are reported in Tab.28-Tab.31.  
The differential is remarkable and, accordingly with the estimates of Lerner index, 
higher during off-peak hours. In the fourth quarter of 2014, for instance, at 0 a.m.  this 
differential reached the 84%: starting from an average market-clearing price of 47 
euro, if market became perfectly competitive, the new clearing price would be 
approximately near to 26 euro. 
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Tab 28: Comparison between the old and the new Market Clearing Price by Hour.  Single Market. Quarter 1-2, 2013 
2013 First Quarter Second Quarter 
Hour 
Old Market 
Clearing 
Price 
New 
Market 
Clearing 
Price 
% 
Old Market 
Clearing 
Price 
New 
Market 
Clearing 
Price 
% 
1 56.6 27.7 -51.2 64.3 31.0 -51.8 
2 60.7 34.2 -43.6 52.4 28.1 -46.4 
3 48.0 23.2 -51.6 50.5 27.4 -45.8 
4 38.3 18.2 -52.5 43.8 25.1 -42.8 
5 36.3 16.4 -54.9 40.8 24.9 -38.9 
6 45.0 21.9 -51.4 45.1 26.3 -41.7 
7 59.7 35.0 -41.4 56.2 29.8 -47.0 
8 70.8 42.9 -39.4 74.3 36.0 -51.5 
9 63.9 44.0 -31.1 73.9 45.9 -37.9 
10 64.3 44.1 -31.3 59.3 33.3 -44.0 
11 61.5 36.6 -40.6 55.1 31.6 -42.6 
12 60.5 37.0 -38.7 50.6 27.4 -45.9 
13 60.4 42.2 -30.0 22.2 13.5 -39.2 
14 52.9 36.2 -31.6 21.7 12.2 -43.5 
15 30.1 14.6 -51.6 29.2 15.3 -47.5 
16 43.4 25.2 -42.0 37.0 20.4 -44.8 
17 53.4 36.9 -31.0 48.1 28.2 -41.2 
18 77.0 60.0 -22.0 54.6 29.3 -46.5 
19 72.0 49.3 -31.5 66.1 37.4 -43.5 
20 115.0 126.0 9.6 77.8 49.4 -36.5 
21 80.0 57.3 -28.4 130.3 124.5 -4.4 
22 72.5 43.4 -40.1 79.0 53.8 -31.8 
23 64.8 42.7 -34.1 68.4 37.2 -45.6 
24 60.5 39.7 -34.4 63.3 31.2 -50.7 
Average 56.8 34.1 -42.1 56.8 34.1 -42.1 
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Tab 29: Comparison between the old and the new Market Clearing Price by Hour.  Single Market. Quarter 3-4, 2013 
2013 Third Quarter Fourth Quarter 
Hour 
Old Market 
Clearing 
Price 
New 
Market 
Clearing 
Price 
% 
Old Market 
Clearing 
Price 
New 
Market 
Clearing 
Price 
% 
1 82.0 71.4 -13.0 59.4 37.6 -36.7 
2 60.3 59.6 -1.2 58.1 36.3 -37.5 
3 60.0 59.1 -1.6 50.2 31.3 -37.6 
4 58.9 60.1 2.1 44.9 28.9 -35.7 
5 58.3 59.4 1.8 43.0 28.0 -34.9 
6 58.3 59.1 1.4 54.8 34.1 -37.8 
7 61.1 60.9 -0.4 65.0 41.6 -36.0 
8 65.5 63.8 -2.7 64.6 32.6 -49.6 
9    64.2 42.4 -33.9 
10 67.6 65.3 -3.3 62.3 39.3 -36.8 
11 66.0 65.9 -0.2 62.0 38.9 -37.2 
12 63.2 63.1 -0.2 53.7 33.4 -37.7 
13 59.5 59.9 0.7 53.9 30.9 -42.8 
14 60.0 60.6 1.0 54.9 31.0 -43.6 
15 62.7 61.8 -1.5 61.9 39.2 -36.7 
16 62.9 61.6 -2.1 61.1 40.2 -34.2 
17    60.4 36.4 -39.8 
18    94.0 77.3 -17.7 
19    68.0 39.3 -42.2 
20       
21    64.4 37.1 -42.4 
22       
23    62.1 35.8 -42.4 
24    57.7 30.7 -46.9 
Average 63.1 62.1 -1.3 60.0 37.4 -38.2 
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Tab 30: Comparison between the old and the new Market Clearing Price by Hour.  Single Market. Quarter 1-2, 2014 
2014 
First 
Quarter 
 
 Second 
Quarter 
 
 
Hour 
Old Market 
Clearing 
Price 
New Market 
Clearing 
Price 
% 
Old Market 
Clearing 
Price 
New Market 
Clearing 
Price 
% 
1 48.1 26.7 -7.5 49.9 23.3 -53.4 
2 41.6 22.2 -11.8 38.0 16.0 -57.8 
3 32.9 15.7 -14.8 33.7 14.6 -56.8 
4 27.5 12.7 -18.8 32.4 14.7 -54.6 
5 29.1 13.6 -17.8 33.5 14.8 -55.7 
6 34.8 17.6 -15.8 41.4 18.1 -56.2 
7 51.2 31.7 -10.8 46.3 18.7 -59.6 
8 55.2 32.6 -3.9 65.1 38.8 -40.4 
9 54.0 32.6 -6.4 59.0 38.1 -35.4 
10 66.6 45.7 -1.9 54.3 28.6 -47.3 
11 55.7 33.5 -4.5 43.7 18.3 -58.1 
12 49.1 31.2 -14.5 44.3 18.3 -58.6 
13 45.8 24.6 -7.9 39.5 16.2 -58.9 
14 44.3 27.4 -17.4 36.3 16.0 -56.0 
15 48.4 31.3 -16.3 39.5 16.4 -58.6 
16 45.7 27.4 -14.3 38.3 15.1 -60.6 
17 62.3 37.4 2.2 43.0 17.4 -59.6 
18 63.6 41.9 -2.3 45.8 17.9 -60.8 
19 74.0 45.9 12.0 50.9 19.7 -61.3 
20 79.6 50.2 16.6 56.9 28.2 -50.4 
21 63.1 40.7 -1.4 71.4 43.5 -39.1 
22 62.3 37.8 1.7 55.4 23.4 -57.7 
23 56.3 31.4 0.5 49.4 19.3 -60.8 
24 50.2 26.9 -3.3 46.2 25.6 -44.6 
Average 51.7 30.8 -6.6 46.4 21.7 -54.3 
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Tab 31: Comparison between the old and the new Market Clearing Price by Hour. Single Market, Quarter 3-4, 2014 
2014 
Third 
Quarter 
  
Fourth 
Quarter 
  
Hour 
Old Market 
Clearing 
Price 
New 
Market 
Clearing 
Price 
% 
Old Market 
Clearing 
Price 
New 
Market 
Clearing 
Price 
% 
1 49.1 20.4 -58.4 45.4 25.1 -81.0 
2 47.5 18.1 -62.0 41.4 22.6 -83.2 
3 50.5 17.3 -65.7 40.3 23.0 -75.1 
4 46.7 16.3 -65.0 36.5 20.5 -78.3 
5 46.2 16.3 -64.6 37.9 21.2 -78.3 
6 48.7 18.2 -62.7 41.1 22.7 -80.8 
7 58.8 34.7 -40.9 56.3 33.7 -67.0 
8 51.0 20.4 -59.9 59.6 33.3 -79.1 
9    67.1 41.5 -61.8 
10 130.0 130.0 0.0 66.2 43.4 -52.6 
11    63.6 40.4 -57.5 
12    62.6 42.5 -47.3 
13 53.4 26.7 -50.0 60.5 35.5 -70.3 
14 53.4 34.9 -34.7 59.7 35.6 -67.7 
15 57.6 46.1 -19.9 62.1 37.4 -65.9 
16 58.3 46.2 -20.6 66.5 42.8 -55.6 
17 50.6 26.7 -47.3 73.9 55.9 -32.1 
18 95.0 70.1 -26.3 77.6 54.9 -41.3 
19 135.1 135.1 0.0 80.8 56.9 -41.9 
20    73.7 47.2 -56.1 
21    60.3 37.9 -58.8 
22       
23    54.7 30.1 -81.7 
24 49.0 20.3 -58.5 47.9 26.0 -84.4 
Average 63.6 41.0 -43.3 58.1 36.1 -65.1 
The graphs below show  some examples of market resolutions and compare the old 
equilibrium with the new one, where the market supply curve shifted down by the 
effect of Lerner index. The comparison has been performed for all the quarters of 2013 
and 2014 and focused on two hours of the day (2 a.m.  and 2 p.m.), one referring to 
peak period and the other concerning the off-peak one.  
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Fig. 2: Comparison between market clearing prices. Quarter 3-4, 2013. 
Fig. 1: Comparison between market clearing prices. Quarter 1-2, 2013. 
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Fig. 4:  Comparison between market clearing prices. Quarter 3-4, 2014. 
Fig. 3: Comparison between market clearing prices. Quarter 1-2, 2014. 
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Graphs highlight how the adjusting the market from the effect of market power 
results in lower equilibrium price given the shifting of supply curve. As the elasticity of 
market demand is not significant, the new market resolution do not involve an 
increase in the volumes traded.  
In this paper the price differential was computed only for the hours when single 
market occurred, since the effects of congestion on the demand side has not been 
investigated and deserved to be analyzed in further researches. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper addressed the issue of computing a virtual competitive market equilibrium 
in the Italian wholesale electricity market for the 2013 and the 2014 using the hourly 
data provided by GME. Lerner index was taken as a measure of the market power 
exercised by the main suppliers, taking into account the effect of congestion, to 
compute the competitive virtual bidding behavior of the main market operators. 
The results of the Lerner index computation clearly show that firms exercised 
different market power and ENEL, the former state-owned monopolist, reported the 
higher index. Moreover, market power is higher when transmission constraints are not 
violated and during the off-peak hours, when the number of generators is lower and 
consumers’ demand is more inelastic since electricity is an essential commodity 
whose consumption can not be postponed. 
The Lerner indexes were then used to adjust the prices bid by the strategic 
competitors and construct the new market supply curve depurated by the market 
power effects. The simulated market resolutions clearly show how the new marginal 
prices (PUN) are lower since the removed mark-up (the market power of each firm) 
made supply curves shift down.   
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